Small debt, large problems in Cyprus: How even small debt in a British Colony led to the political crisis and violence in October 1931. by Apostolides, Alexander
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Small debt, large problems in Cyprus:
How even small debt in a British Colony
led to the political crisis and violence in
October 1931.
Alexander Apostolides
European University Cyprus
11. December 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43210/
MPRA Paper No. 43210, posted 11. December 2012 12:51 UTC
Small debt, large problems in Cyprus: How even small debt in a British Colony led to the 
political crisis and violence in October 1931. 
 
VERSION GENEVA: Preliminary: Please do not 
cite without permission 
Alexander Apostolides
1
 
Economic History Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton 
Street London, WC2A 2AE, UK.  
 
Keywords 
Colonial Development, GDP estimation, Great Depression, Colonialism, Cyprus.  
 
Abstract:  
 
During the interwar period Cyprus faced a small deficit, yet the inflexibility of the colonial 
finance structure created a political impasse. As a result the disagreements between the Colonial 
government and the Cypriot elected members of the islands legislative assembly sparked 
violence against the regime. Such violence would not have been possible if the already aggrieved 
political and economic situation allowed those with nationalistic agenda to undermine the 
legitimacy of the colonial regime. Although the traditional argument indicates that the 1931 riots 
were a purely nationalistic act,   the disagreements of the colonial government and the actions of 
the leaders of the largest communities have to be understood within the sense of increasing crisis 
caused by the continual fall GDP. At the same time, the political situation was paralysed to react 
in a severe economic depression in part due to the disagreements between the Governor and the 
colonial office in London on one hand and the internal struggles for control within the Turkish 
and Greek communities. As a result the tinder for the violence in 1931 may have been 
nationalistic, but the fuel was provided by the prolonged economic crisis in Cyprus.  
 
The economic crisis influenced the political stagnation, reduced the ability of government to 
react and created a sense of imminent crisis that could only be averted through drastic action.   
Some commonalities may be seen with current events in Cyprus, especially in how government 
resists a structural reduction of government revenue just when public opinion and economic 
orthodoxy (of the time) seemed to suggest it.  
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 Current Situation in Cyprus:  
 
On Tuesday the 4
th
 of December 2012, the president of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, announced 
on television that Cyprus will be signing a memorandum to borrow 17 billion euros from the 
collective colloquially known as “Troika” (comprising of the representatives of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)
2
). The European Commission estimates that the Cypriot government deficit will reach 
5.3% of GDP in 2012, and deep cuts to the 2013 budget are expected. Despite the fact that 
interest groups (government officials, government monopolies, educators) have warned of 
repercussions if the agreement is implemented, there has not been substantial protest movement 
against the proposed austerity measures, which are supported by all the political parties.  
 
Was it inevitable for Cyprus to ask for a bailout in 2012? There is no doubt that the close 
economic interaction with Greece, especially in the banking industry led to the destabilisation of 
the Cypriot banking system. The increase of loan defaults in Greece, combined with the haircut 
in government bonds, led the two largest banks (with total assets larger than the GDP of 
Cyprus
3
) to ask for a yet unspecified amount of government support (subject to independent 
audit). Due to the need to price assets as a “mark to market” the needs of the banking system 
(including the cooperative sector) to meet the tier 1 capital requirement of 9% are expected to be 
close to 10bn euro. However, the government would have faced the need for a bailout without 
the banking issues due to the combination of the increasing deficits and the need to roll over 
expired debt. A full 6bn is needed just for government rollover of debt, as this government chose 
to just borrow short term (2 to 3 years maturity) over the last four years, and as a result it is 
facing close to 80% of the current debt maturing in 2012/2013. An additional 1bn is needed for 
the government budget deficit, which has been breaking the government own estimates since 
taking office.      
 
Since the start of the global financial crisis there have been persistent calls by opposition parties, 
business organizations and the governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus for a reconsideration of 
the government expenditures in order to reduce the government deficits, only to be ignored by 
the government, which chose to increase the deficit. When the Cypriot government found itself 
facing prohibitive interest rates in the world markets it chose to borrow a substantial amount of 
its debt short term, only to have a very large proportion due for repayment in 2012. The 
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combination of the bank bailout, the debt rollover and the large deficit will result to the debt to 
GDP of Cyprus will rocket from 48.6%
4
 in 2008 over 150% in 2012.  
 
The response to the current crisis:  
 
This crisis seems to have convinced policymakers at a European level that the answer is more 
regulation for the Eurozone. By joining the monetary union, Eurozone countries, like Cyprus,  
effectively surrendered monetary policy to the European Central Bank, as well as committing to 
fiscal policy restraints (through the Stability and Growth pact). There seems to be a belief in 
European stakeholders that problems faced by Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Italy arise 
due to insufficient control over fiscal matters on an EU level despite the growth and stability pact 
of the Eurozone such arrangements. It seems that the concerns of the Euro’s structure was 
highlighted by academics prior to the crisis
5
. Such concerns are leading the current European 
response to the crisis: the need to have further fiscal integration and coordinated banking control. 
However, the new measures, described below, have led to substantial disagreement from 
academia as not really correcting the main weakness of the Euro’s structure6.  
 
The current Eurozone crisis has led to sustained attempts to change the infrastructure of the 
monetary union, without leading to the collective responsibility for government debts of nation 
states. New agreements such as the “Six pack” measures of additional fiscal surveillance, the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and the May 2012 “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance”, as well as the recent agreement for common banking supervisory arrangements 
seem to point out that the EU policy makes see as the main issue that they need to tackle is how 
to eliminate moral hazard for national governments, committing them to restructuring their 
national economies rather postponing decisions through borrowing.  
 
With the exception of the unified banking supervision programme, the above changes seek to 
severely restrain the ability of nation states to dictate an autonomous fiscal policy if a fiscal 
deficit ensues. The above is supposed to encourage fiscal stability within the Eurozone, allowing 
Eurozone countries to be better prepared and capable to withstand future global economic crises 
without the need of external aid. 
 
Will the current Eurozone changes provide the ability to whether global downturns for 
nation states? A case study from 1930’s Cyprus 
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Why is the past relevant to the current situation? Cyprus (and Malta), who are current members 
of the Eurozone, are former British colonies. The proposed changes to the Eurozone (with the 
exception the new unified banking supervision) partially echo past colonial arrangements. 
Colonial Cyprus was under strict monetary control through a currency control board, where the 
monetary supply was linked to the amount of sterling deposits in London
7
. Additionally, colonial 
governors would be under pressure from London if the colony’s administration failed to be 
financially self-sufficient
8
. Borrowing from the private London money market was encouraged 
for infrastructure projects, but only if the colony could repay itself and if the British government 
was not forced to step in and service the loan. Hence there was no collective guarantee of 
colonial loans between Britain and Cyprus.  
 
Despite being part of the British Empire, Cyprus was originally not a colony per se, but a 
possession granted in 1878 which could be given back to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, 
despite having no substantial debt, it was facing an issue that echoed the need of debt service of a 
state today. The occupation of Cyprus in 1878 came with a provision that stated that the yearly 
amount of tax £92,799 pounds sterling would be given to the Ottoman Empire in lieu of lost tax 
revenue. Although such a large amount was not extracted by the Porte from Cyprus, the colonial 
office in London demanded it raised by the colony
9
. Thus the mandates of the British 
administrators of Cyprus focused in raising government revenue through maintaining the 
Ottoman taxation system rather than making institutional changes that might jeopardise the 
creation of a surplus to pay the amount required
10
.The amount debited to the colony ranged from 
40% to 55% (depending on the agricultural season) of the government’s revenue, and with the 
exception of the years 1892 and 1893 the colonial office had to ask for a grant in aid ranging 
between £15,000 to £55,000 to cover the shortfall. After insistent protests that the yearly request 
for aid disturbed planning, the ‘tribute’ assistance fixed as a permanent grant-in-aid of £50,000 in 
1907; yet £42,799 of the ‘tribute’ remained a burden to government expenditure until 1927, 
when it was abolished for a £10,000 annual contribution to imperial defence
11
. By 1927, the 
island’s colonial status was also on a secure footing after it was annexed by Britain in 1914 and 
made a crown colony in 1925.  
 
In summary, Cyprus significantly reduced the fiscal pressures of servicing the “tribute” on the 
government budget prior to the great depression by an effective reduction of the external 
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servicing by £32,799. In 1927 government revenue was £705,996, thus indicating a reduction of 
4.6%, a significant but not an overwhelming improvement. 
  
It is worth noting that there was a reduction in the debt service burden for the republic in Cyprus 
upon joining the Eurozone in 2008. The risk premium of government bond yields fell, freeing up 
funds from the government expenditure side
12
.  
  
 
How did the Colonial government react to this windfall gain?  
 
During the interwar period there was a movement for change within the colonial office: some 
members believed in encouraging governors to initiate positive development measures, with an 
aim to forge the empire into a more prosperous and concrete whole
13
. The appointment of Leo 
Amery as secretary of state for the colonies strengthened the hand of these ‘new imperialists’14. 
However, there was substantial resistance to such views within the colonial bureaucracy: as a 
result colonial officers who wanted more active development measures were not always 
successful, especially if such measures would involve additional British expenditure and thus 
necessitating approval from the British treasury. However, Amery sometimes succeeded in 
placing those who shared this point of view in key posts and he was instrumental in appointing 
Sir Ronald Storrs, as governor of Cyprus in 1926
15
.  
 
Sir Ronald Storrs was an ambitious man who at the age of 45 had already served as Oriental 
Secretary in Cairo and Military Governor of Jerusalem. He had influence in circles that previous 
High Commissioners of Cyprus did not have access to. Storrs arrived in Cyprus facing an 
unusual situation. The declaration of the island as a crown colony removed any legal claim to the 
raising of the “Tribute” – the amount of £92,799 previously mentioned. He played an 
instrumental part towards the removal of the above payment and its replacement by a £10,000 
fee for imperial defence and hence deserves the credit for the existence of this windfall, even 
though he kept secret part of the agreement waiving the right of the colony to the accumulated 
balances of the tribute. 
 
Sir Ronald Storrs believed that an increase in economic prosperity would alleviate the increasing 
nationalistic pressures of the majority Greek Cypriots for union with Greece
16
. Such demands 
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were given a new impetuous by the offer of Cyprus to Greece during the First World War, the 
return of Cypriot volunteers in the Greek army and Woodrow Wilson’s call for self-
determination.  
 
Storrs devised a strategy to increase the standard of living based on the fiscal windfall, with the 
ultimate aim of reducing nationalistic sentiment. Focusing on increasing the role of government 
in terms of healthcare, education and infrastructure, Storrs increased both the wage and size of 
the bureaucracy in order to be able to attract experts in Cyprus, putting them to work on the 
longstanding issues of rural debt, irrigation, and healthcare. Despite the original desire that the 
windfall gain would be used as repayment for a development loan (supported by the elected 
members of the legislative council), the colonial government found the windfall used up by 
government expenditure and hence unavailable for infrastructure loan amortisation. As the 
windfall was quickly used up in expanding government expenditure no effort to revamp the tax 
system away from import duties and agriculture taxation took place: in fact in an effort to 
increase revenue, specific taxation such as the “prevention of locust tax” was diverted to other 
uses.  
 
As a result government revenue and expenditure expanded dramatically, despite the lacklustre 
growth of GDP (see table 1). The per capita grow of income was substantially less than the 
growth of government expenditure in each full year Storrs was Governor (his appointment was 
announced in August 1926). In fact with an average growth of GDP of 0.9%, the annual growth 
of government revenue was 10.3%. The colonial government under Storrs increased the 
importance of the colonial government in the Cypriot economy, with government expenditure 
rising from 11.1% of GDP in 1926 to 16.1% in 1931. It is true that Cyprus still had a very small 
share of government in 1931, but the share of government was increasing rapidly at a time when 
the economy of Cyprus was struggling. 
 
What is interesting is that the governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs begins with a volatile yet rapidly 
increasing income, but still the increase of expenditure and revenue of the government was far in 
above the growth of the economy even prior to the great depression.  
 
  
 Table 1A: Cypriot GDP, Population, Per capita GDP, Government Revenue and Expenditure in constant 1938 Cyprus pounds
17
  
Year GDP Population 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
Government 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure 
Budget Deficit 
/ Surplus Year GDP Population 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
Government 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Deficit/ 
Surplus 
1921 £3,732,544 310,715 £12.01 £418,112 £415,599 £2,513 1930 4,911,844 344,042 £14.28 £677,372 £747,559 £-70,187 
1922 £4,001,854 314,253 £12.73 £471,461 £393,196 £78,265 1931 4,605,234 347,959 £13.23 £727,766 £742,164 £-14,397 
1923 £4,125,691 317,830 £12.98 £424,504 £435,959 £-11,455 1932 4,213,399 353,982 £11.90 £761,123 £748,050 £13,073 
1924 £4,029,952 321,449 £12.54 £435,785 £393,591 £42,194 1933 4,232,438 360,109 £11.75 £748,102 £698,357 £49,745 
1925 £4,342,975 325,109 £13.36 £489,381 £453,850 £35,531 1934 4,755,859 366,342 £12.98 £776,723 £722,396 £54,327 
1926 £4,169,484 328,810 £12.68 £444,797 £463,148 £-18,351 1935 5,318,422 372,683 £14.27 £899,557 £853,725 £45,832 
1927 £4,678,897 332,554 £14.07 £455,657 £427,200 £28,456 1936 5,237,377 379,134 £13.81 £824,552 £760,560 £63,992 
1928 £4,574,781 336,340 £13.60 £507,504 £483,490 £24,014 1937 6,226,713 385,697 £16.14 £956,656 £835,170 £121,487 
1929 £5,189,706 340,169 £15.26 £637,223 £602,063 £35,160 1938 6,544,460 392,373 £16.68 £1,023,230 £908,024 £115,206 
Table 1B: Growth rate of Cypriot GDP, Per capita GDP, Government Revenue and Expenditure 
Year GDP 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
Government 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure Year GDP 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
Government 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure 
1921-1922 7.2% 6.0% 12.8% -5.4% 1930-1931 -6.2% -7.3% 7.4% -0.7% 
1922-1923 3.1% 1.9% -10.0% 10.9% 1931-1932 -8.5% -10.1% 4.6% 0.8% 
1923-1924 -2.3% -3.4% 2.7% -9.7% 1932-1933 0.5% -1.3% -1.7% -6.6% 
1924-1925 7.8% 6.6% 12.3% 15.3% 1933-1934 12.4% 10.5% 3.8% 3.4% 
1925-1926 -4.0% -5.1% -9.1% 2.0% 1934-1935 11.8% 9.9% 15.8% 18.2% 
1926-1927 12.2% 11.0% 2.4% -7.8% 1935-1936 -1.5% -3.2% -8.3% -10.9% 
1927-1928 -2.2% -3.3% 11.4% 13.2% 1936-1937 18.9% 16.9% 16.0% 9.8% 
1928-1929 13.4% 12.2% 25.6% 24.5% 1937-1938 5.1% 3.3% 7.0% 8.7% 
1929-1930 -5.4% -6.4% 6.3% 24.2% 1926-1931 2.0% 0.9% 10.3% 9.9% 
Note: Deflated using the CPI provided in appendix H of Apostolides, A. (2010) Source:  Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938) “Government Revenue and Expenditure”  
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 Table 2A: Cypriot GDP, Population, Per capita GDP, Government Revenue and Expenditure 1997-2014 (projected) 
18
  
Year 
GDP 
constant 
prices 
Population 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
Government 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure 
Budget Deficit 
/ Surplus 
Year GDP Population 
Per capita 
GDP 
Government 
Revenue 
Government 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Deficit/ 
Surplus 
Unit Bn Euro Thousands Euro Bn Euro Bn Euro Million Euro Unit Bn Euro Bn Euro Thousands Bn Euro Bn Euro Million Euro 
1997 9,895 673 14,701 2,448 2,845 -397 2006 13,955 758 18,413 6,069 6,244 -175 
1998 10,391 682 15,234 2,776 3,130 -354 2007 14,666 776 18,890 7,126 6,570 556 
1999 10,893 690 15,791 2,967 3,365 -398 2008+ 15,192 797 19,064 7,389 7,228 161 
2000 11,439 697 16,400 3,455 3,689 -234 2009 14,910 819 18,203 6,764 7,794 -1,031 
2001 11,900 706 16,867 3,830 4,071 -242 2010 15,081 840 17,957 7,213 8,139 -926 
2002 12,153 714 17,028 3,943 4,435 -492 2011 15,153 862 17,579 7,282 8,401 -1,119 
2003 12,380 723 17,125 4,428 5,192 -764 2012p 14,812 876 16,912 7,510 8,359 -848 
2004* 12,904 733 17,602 4,828 5,347 -520 2013p 14,670 890 16,490 7,315 8,318 -1,003 
2005 13,402 744 18,013 5,535 5,869 -334 2014p 14,770 904 16,346 7,408 8,557 -1,149 
Table 2B: Growth rates of Cypriot GDP, Per capita GDP, Government Revenue and Expenditure 
Year GDP 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
Revenue Expenditure Year GDP 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
Revenue Expenditure 
1997-1998 5.0% 3.6% 13.4% 10.0% 2006-2007 5.1% 2.6% 17.4% 5.2% 
1998-1999 4.8% 3.7% 6.9% 7.5% 2007-2008 3.6% 0.9% 3.7% 10.0% 
1999-2000 5.0% 3.9% 16.4% 9.6% 2008-2009 -1.9% -4.5% -8.5% 7.8% 
2000-2001 4.0% 2.8% 10.9% 10.4% 2009-2010 1.1% -1.4% 6.6% 4.4% 
2001-2002 2.1% 1.0% 3.0% 8.9% 2010-2011 0.5% -2.1% 1.0% 3.2% 
2002-2003 1.9% 0.6% 12.3% 17.1% 2011-2012 -2.3% -3.8% 3.1% -0.5% 
2003-2004 4.2% 2.8% 9.0% 3.0% 2012-2013 -1.0% -2.5% -2.6% -0.5% 
2004-2005 3.9% 2.3% 14.6% 9.8% 2013-2014 0.7% -0.9% 1.3% 2.9% 
2005-2006 4.1% 2.2% 9.6% 6.4% 2008-2012C -0.6% -3.0% 0.4% 3.7% 
Note: *Joined the European Union. + Joined the Eurozone pProjected CDemetris Christofias time in office 
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What was occurring in Cyprus during the period prior to the current economic crisis? The 
following table gives some clues. The revenue and expenditure of the Cyprus government once 
again outstripped output growth and likewise, government expenditure kept rising even after it 
became clear that 2010 was a year of severe recession.   
 
It is worth noting that the presidency of Demetris Christfias began with a decline of per capita 
GDP which we would call severe (-4.5% in 2008-2009). As a result of the way taxes were 
collected the decline in revenue was -8.5% while revenues increased by 7.8% causing a jump in 
the borrowing needs of the government for which the government has not been able to recover.  
 
The general economic dimension is not here in order to compare two recessions (as they have 
different methodologies: the older series is deflated to constant prices making even government 
expenditure and revenue more volatile) but to indicate that despite being different crises, the 
governments faced similar dilemmas: as GDP slowed down, governments faced the dilemma of 
reducing the growth rate of expenditure in the name of fiscal prudency or tax/borrow. 
   
The Great Depression and its impact on Cyprus: Credit Crunch 
 
Since 1921 was a year of severe recession in Cyprus, the per capita GDP indicates that recovery 
was slow in the 1920s. Like other areas of Europe, the agricultural sector was already suffering a 
severe debt and credit crisis through a reduction of prices from their First World War peak
19
. The 
deflationary effects resulted to rural borrowers being unable to repay the rural debt incurred 
during the war as they extended cultivation, since the real cost of repayment rocketed
20
. Thus the 
additional deflation during the great depression resulted to a dramatic increase in the real cost of 
debt service. This reduction of the price of crops made private debt service of farm debt 
impossible
21
. The debt of rural producers was the most important issue in the Cypriot press and 
the problem remained unresolved until the start of the Second World War
22
.  
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Table 3: Price Indexes of Cypriot products, selected years (1938=100) 
 
CPI Carobs Potatoes Wine Cotton 
Wheat 
(Wholesale) 
Wheat 
(Retail) 
Goats Cheese 
1912 - 90 88 305 130 148 90 300 108 
1916 - 106 210 534 129 322 230 290 92 
1919 - 133 250 763 292 329 360 350 157 
1922 142 91 186 275 158 159 160 200 254 
1923 134 81 158 175 206 130 110 110 185 
1926 142 93 142 175 164 216 180 150 195 
1927 144 95 156 175 163 197 180 200 185 
1929 141 135 150 138 197 202 140 225 179 
1930 119 64 106 125 123 140 130 175 154 
1931 107 45 138 125 103 117 110 100 159 
1932 106 65 107 125 22 106 100 100 133 
1938 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: CPI- Apostolides, A. (2010) “Economic Growth or Continuing Stagnation? Estimating the GDP of Cyprus and Malta, 
1921-1938”, London School of Economics Theses, Appendix; Rest - Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1911-1938).  
 
The deflation during the great depression affected land prices in a severe way; the decline of 
prices realised at sale relative to the debt being recovered indicates that land was worth much 
less than when the said mortgage contract was made. According to available Land Registry 
Office data in table 4, the debts were increasing during the period and so were the incidences of 
forced sales of property, forcing the government to restrict forced sales in 1933 and 1934
23
.  
 
Table 3: Loans, Debts and Forced Sales 1921-1938  
 
Total Value of 
Mortgages 
Share of Mortgages to 
GDP 
Total Value of 
Property 
Number of forced 
sales 
Price realised at sale / debt sought 
to be recovered 
1921 N/A N/A N/A 1.416 74% 
1922 N/A N/A N/A 2.386 66% 
1923 N/A N/A N/A 2470 57% 
1924 N/A N/A N/A 3.304 59% 
1925 N/A N/A N/A 3.108 60% 
1926 N/A N/A N/A 2.916 56% 
1927 £1,647,810 24% £14,200,000 2405 61% 
1928 £1,644,574 26% £15,500,000 1639 57% 
1929 £1,782,452 29% £15,520,886 1559 58% 
1930 £1,949,320 37% £15,634,975 1444 55% 
1931 £2,005,051 41% £15,748,761 1795 57% 
1932 N/A N/A N/A 1150 51% 
1933 £2,212,548 51% N/A 134 69% 
1934 £2,299,842 49% £16,308,464 387 69% 
1935 £2,269,675 44% £16,717,008 1508 57% 
1936 £2,290,980 44% £16,529,383 2067 54% 
1937 £2,203,175 35% £16,673,889 1999 51% 
1938 £2,207,896 34% £16,862,739 1491 53% 
Source: Georghallides, (1979) p.429, Cyprus, Annual Report of the Land Registry Department, (1921-1938).  
                                                 
23
 Cyprus, Annual Report of the Land Registry Department 1934, (Cyprus, GPO, 1935) p.4 
The severe decline in GDP and the increase in rural debt default would not have been as severe if 
the global economic downturn did not coincide with a severe drought. The Cypriot economy 
faced two exogenous blows outside its control: the global great depression occurred at the same 
time as one of the deepest and most prolonged droughts on record. The drought hit the rural 
majority in 1930 when they were already under pressure by the decline of prices of their products 
and the increase of the real cost of repayment, while at the same time being asked by the 
government to contribute more through increasing taxation. 
 
Rainfall in Cyprus was always erratic, but consecutively bad years are unusual events. In 1930 
rainfall was slightly lower than average, yet the seasons 1931-32 and 1932-1933, rainfall was 
much lower than 70% of the average (defined as a major drought event), while the rains in 1933-
1934 were just between 71%-80%
24
. This has a big impact to a colony which produced 30% of 
its GDP from agriculture in 1929: the majority of production was rain-fed or rain-capture, with 
less than 21% of agricultural production having access to other water sources
25
. The drought was 
so severe that even industries not directly to water suffered serious losses. Animals were culled 
due to the lack of adequate fodder and there was even a reduction of land with access to 
irrigation to just 15% of the cultivated land in 1931.  
 
Thus, as global agricultural prices were declining, the yield of Cypriot agricultural products 
collapsed due to the lack of sufficient aquifers
26
. The combined decline in output and prices led 
to a collapse in the value of output; this especially affected grain farmers of the Mesaoria plain 
around Nicosia, who were completely dependent on rainfall. The result was that rural incomes 
were squeezed both by a decline in agricultural production and by a precipitous fall of prices, 
dramatically effecting rural incomes. The demands of the government for greater taxation 
squeezed the majority rural population still further.  
 
It is important to remember that for the farmer, the decline in incomes was greater than the 
decline of GDP indicates, since the decline here is in constant prices, thus taking into account 
only the decline in quantities and not prices. It is not easy to be as accurate in current prices due 
to the lack of substantial price data, but using the constructed CPI as a single deflator indicates 
that the fall of income in current prices in 1933 when compared to 1929 was 30%. 
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Table 4: Selected indexes of production 1929-1933 (1929=100) 
 
Value 
of 
imports 
Value 
of 
exports 
GDP 
Total 
Agriculture, 
Forestry 
and Fishing 
Mining 
and 
Quarrying 
Annual 
Crops 
Growing 
of 
Perennial 
Crops 
Animal 
products 
Growing 
of 
Vegetables 
Growing 
of 
oleaginous 
crops 
Growing 
of 
cereals 
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1930 72 72 95 99 65 90 114 99 81 14 87 
1931 71 62 89 88 52 70 105 102 80 135 65 
1932 68 54 81 80 42 48 86 100 68 12 44 
1933 63 51 82 74 58 60 67 94 59 17 62 
1934 72 64 92 89 61 83 90 91 68 70 85 
Cumulative 
Fall 1929-
1933 
-37 -49 -18% -26% -42% -40% -33% -6% -41% -83 -38% 
Share of 
GDP in 
1929 
38% 30% 100% 31% 8% 12% 8% 7% 2% 1% 8% 
Source: Apostolides, A. Economic Growth or Continuing Stagnation? Estimating the GDP of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938. (Phd 
thesis, London School of Economics, 2010)  
 
The decline of the agricultural sector dragged the income of affiliated industries downwards. The 
combination of decline in agricultural prices, the great drought and the reduction of migration 
opportunities (that increased the growth of population) meant that the per capita recovery was 
slow. And yet government expenditures kept increasing, despite the colony not having the 
automatic stabilisers of increased social insurance expenditure.  
 
The insistence of the government to increases taxes while incomes were being squeezed created 
pressure to the political actors who were elected by their communities, the delegates of the 
Legislative Council. As government was continually demanding an increase in taxation, the 
council members requested an intervention of the government to alleviate the issues affecting the 
rural majority.  
 
Perhaps presciently for the current situation, the decline of income during the great depression 
created a credit crunch and a crippling of the informal credit system: the transition mechanisms 
were price deflation and the decline in land prices. The current need for a bailout of the major 
banking institutions might have been initiated by poor foreign investments but the decline in 
prices has been a mechanism of transition, once again reducing the amount of credit 
significantly.  
 
Government Response in the great depression: “Business as Usual” 
 
How did the colonial government respond to the complex problems caused by the great 
depression? The governor attempted a “Business as Usual” approach of increasing taxation and 
maintaining the expansion of the government. It must be said that the decision to go ahead like it 
was “Business as Usual” was common common colonial government response in Cyprus. But 
such approach stored problems that needed to be dealt with further down the road. An example 
was the existing tax system during the great depression in Cyprus. The taxation system was 
largely based on farming taxes and import/export duties; property tax was a very small share of 
revenue and income tax was not levied
27
. Taxation in Cyprus was particularly regressive as it 
relied heavily on the taxing staples such as petrol, flour, sugar, salt and tobacco as well as the 
taxation of pigs, trees
28
. Despite the complicated and inefficient tax system, and the fact that 66% 
of the government revenue was related to the import and export of commodities in 1927, there 
was no willingness to restructure it
29
. Thus despite Oakden describing the tax rate of Cyprus as 
modest, he did concede that a disproportional amount was extracted from two sectors which are 
the most cyclical sectors of the economy: Trade and Agriculture
30
.  
 
During the great depression, the reduction in trade was much more severe than the reduction of 
income. As a result the colonial government found its revenue targets continuously missed. 
Storrs government constantly increased taxation with additional laws, with eleven tax increases 
in six year. These increases needed the approval of the Legislative Council.  
 
The existence of the council meant that the acceptance of the tax increase was in theory not 
guaranteed. The legislative council was granted early in the British reign in Cyprus and provided 
for government officials and representatives of the two largest religions in Cyprus, Christian (the 
majority; overwhelmingly Greek) and Moslem (the minority, overwhelmingly Turkish). The 
community leaders were elected. Elections were open to anyone who paid the very modest 
property taxes and hence a large proportion of the male population was eligible to vote
31
. The 
council could only vote to approve or reject laws and appropriation budgets sent by the 
government: the government did not have to listen to the opinion of its members or accept laws 
suggested.  
 
In practise the council was a formality due to the use of political patronage. From the beginning 
the council was based on the policy of divide et impera, as the Greek Cypriots (henceforth G/C) 
could always be outvoted by the combination of the Turkish Cypriot (henceforth T/C) 
councillors and the members of the administration. As the government had substantial patronage 
over the T/C community through their control of EVKAF religious foundation, the elected 
officials of the T/C community was largely in favour of the government line
32
.   
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 For example, Ifran Bay was a member of the executive and the legislative council, as well as the Turkish delegate 
of the EVCAF which administered Muslim religious property and charity. Thus his ability to exert substantial 
patronage over the Turkish-Cypriot community depended on maintaining the favour of the colonial administration. 
 However, during the great depression, this divide et impera policy broke down in the face of 
increasing economic distress and perceived government indifference. The control of the 
legislative council was premised on the fact that the minority T/C members would vote with the 
government representatives and thus overrule the majority G/C delegates. Yet from 1930 
onwards, the divide and rule system was cracking, as elections brought delegates willing to vote 
in ways that would defeat the government in economic issues, despite being very against the 
nationalist agenda of the other community.  
 
The 1930 elections for the council saw the community moderates being largely defeated and the 
new, more nationalist councillors willing to resist the demands of the government take their 
place. The electoral losses were mainly a backlash by voters to moderate councillors willing to 
cooperate with the colonial government. On the other hand the councillors felt they were being 
responsible for their electorate but powerless, since “so much power was given to foreigners 
while keeping the Cypriots in positions of great weakness”33. For example, even in the cases 
when the elected members of the council would combine and defeat a bill, the Cypriot 
constitution provided for the ability to enact the bill anyway through an Order-in-council by the 
British monarch.  
 
As additional taxation was needed to maintain the current government expansion, Sir Ronald 
Storrs called on the legislative council. The government insisted in an expansionist revenue 
policy, demanding and being granted additional taxation increases by the council in the period 
1929-1931. He was upbeat about the economic conditions on the island, and suggested further 
increases in taxation in order to protect the Cyprus Agricultural Bank and irrigation projects of 
the Mesaoria plain. Storrs maintained that his government initiated more development projects 
than previous administrators: the ‘tribute’ was abolished, an agricultural bank was established, 
the co-operative movement was expanded; thus he felt that Cyprus was progressing 
economically on the basis of his reforms and continued to believe that 1931 would have been a 
good year for mining, which would have increased the tax receipts through royalties. As a result, 
Storrs felt that there was no need to reduce expenditure despite the depression affecting the 
farming community. Storrs optimism was proven unfounded: yet even in 1931 when the dual 
calamity of the great depression was obvious, Storrs, in his address to the Legislative council, 
saw no reason for reduced optimism or change of course
34
.  
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In fact the mining industry was facing a meltdown. The large Amiantos mine closed due to 
severe financial pressures, while the largest employer in the island, the Cyprus Mines 
Corporation, suspended production in its largest mine
35
.  
 
The fact that the Cyprus government in the period 1930-1931 found itself projecting 
overoptimistic revenue made controlling for the emerging budget deficits very difficult, 
effectively exhausting the limited reserve of the colony. As the reserve was exhausted the 
government was forced to keep ask for more taxation increases from the Legislative council. The 
council was becoming increasingly militant against the combined demand for revenue and their 
belief of the lack of government attention to the needs of the farming sector.  
 
The G/C legislative council deputies, led by the Bishop of Kition, the Metropolitan Nicodemos 
Mylonas, suggested in the discussion for the 1932 appropriations bill that under his calculations 
a deficit of £100,000 would arise in the 1931 appropriation bill, which the island could not cover 
with its remaining reserves. As there was no colonial lender of last resort, the Metropolitan 
worried that further tax increases would be needed in 1932, and instead suggested for a decline 
of government expenditure by £70,000.  
 
The reduction in expenditure requested by the government was effectively nationalistic in 
character: it called for a general reduction in government wage bill, but especially for the higher 
paid British members of staff. Arguing that Cypriots could do the job better and cheaper, and 
noting the fact that the share of British citizens wages to total government expenditure was high 
and rising, the was seen as a way to increase demands for self-determination (voiced by G/C 
politicians) by replacing expensive British officials with competent Cypriots.  
 
Figure 1 indicates that the Cypriot legislative councillors were right to worry that the government 
would cut non-wage expenditure by more than wage expenditure in an effort to balance its 
budget during the depression, their official reasoning for a reduction in the wage bill of the 
highest earners. During the depression the share of wages to total government expenditure 
peaked at 61.7% as the government cut down other spending and focused in paying wages. A 
substantial amount of that wage expenditure was being received by three dozen British 
bureaucrats to the resentment of the legislative council. In 1930 these employees absorbed more 
than 17% of the total government expenditure, as their wage remuneration was compared to UK 
rates rather than local rates of pay. Thus while projects such as the construction of an 
experimental farm and irrigation schemes were being scrapped, Cypriot councillors were 
incensed that wages of such officials were not substantially reduced in order to limit the budget 
deficit.  
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 Figure 1: Wage and British Wage
*
 expenditure as share of government revenue, Cyprus, 1921-1938. 
 
Note: * British wages calculated by selecting the highest salaried officials and removing those whose last name 
suggested Turkish, Greek, Armenian or Maronite descent. Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938). 
 
Nicodemos Mylonas tried to convince all of the G/C elected members at least one of T/C 
delegates to reject the government taxation bills in order to have the law thrown out. His attempt 
to reach common ground was not popular by some G/C and T/C delegates. Nikodemos 
calculated that staying away from nationalistic issues and focusing in immediate farming 
alleviation measures and tax increase resistance had a greater chance of receiving bi-communal 
support
36
.  
 
For the Metropolitan to suggest an alternative plan is a bold overstepping of the council’s power: 
it was a direct overstepping of the remit of the council, which stated it could accept or reject 
laws, but not suggest policy. The colonial officials would not and did not accept the right of the 
council to suggest laws, and instead avoided the need for council approval through their use of 
“orders-in-council”: laws were passed directly in London through a order by the King in session. 
 
The consequence: even a small deficit can have serious political consequences  
 
The militancy of the council made Storrs reluctant to ask the legislative council for the additional 
increase in taxation, certain that it would be defeated
37
. Thus despite the fact that “orders-in-
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council” were for extreme events in relation to the crown, such orders were ever more frequently 
used to circumvent the resistance within the legislative council. Yet late in 1931 the relationship 
between the colonial government in Cyprus and the colonial office in London broke down.  
 
The loss of the majority of the colonial reserve fund in 1931 led to the colonial office of London 
pushing to revise his optimistic revenue figures downwards
38
. The reluctant Storrs would need to 
once again go to the council to demand more taxation for the proposed budgetary expenditure of 
1932
39
. The objective in forcing Storrs into more realistic targets was due to the fact it was not 
willing to act as a lender of last resort: It needed to make sure that the UK taxpayer would not to 
have to pay for a shortfall of the colonial government budget in Cyprus. When the demand for 
more revenue was rejected in the council, there was a delay in London in passing the bill through 
an “order in council”, as they sought to ensure that Storrs did cut expenditure enough to ensure 
the budget would balance. 
 
At this moment it is important to emphasise that within the G/C and T/C communities the dismal 
economic situation created frictions in the political relationships within the communities. 
Throughout the interwar period, the Greek-Cypriot leadership was divided in how to promote 
their demand of union with Greece (Enosis)
40
. Moderates, such as Nikodemos Mylonas were 
willing to work with the colonial government in order to develop the island, hoping to convince 
the British that Cypriots could be trusted with self-government. They saw the dual-government 
constitution given to Malta in 1921 as a possible reward for continued cooperation
41
. The 
moderates believed that after achieving self-government Britain might be convinced to cede 
Cyprus to Greece, as it did previously when it ceded the Ionian Islands protectorate in 1864, and 
when it aided Cretan Enosis in 1913
42
.  
 
Extremists argued that cooperation perpetuated the British occupation of Cyprus. They argued 
that only union with Greece would solve all the economic and social problems of the island, 
since Cypriots would be cared for by a government who had their national interests at heart. For 
them Enosis was the only goal that subjugated others, and a policy of resistance against colonial 
rule was gaining support as the economic situation deteriorated. Many had fought for the Greek 
state during Balkan wars and the First World War, and upon their return to Cyprus they had 
demanded the launching of a struggle to expedite union with Greece
43
. The decision made in 
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1923 by the G/C leadership to cooperate with the colonial government was not accepted by all, 
and extremist sections attacked the councillors in the press thought the great depression, arguing 
that they would not be able to achieve anything other than to legitimise British rule, since the 
colonial government was not interested in the prosperity of the island
44
. 
 
The worsening economic situation brought things to a heated and dangerous impasse both within 
the government and Cypriot elected representatives, but also within the communities themselves. 
The role of traditional communal leaders was being challenged by new more radical members, 
who were ennobled by the feeling that something needed to be done to help the distressed rural 
community.  
 
The result was that a consensus against government plans emerged during the period 1920-1931.  
Greek and Turkish councillors showed signs in indirect cooperation, thus breaking the power of 
“divide and rule” over the council. Speeches by members of both communities, even by 
moderates were exasperated by situation, and asked for the government to listen to their demands 
in terms of economic planning. Although still uncoordinated, the legislators of Greek and 
Turkish origin began to more forcefully demand in 1930 for: greater intervention of the state in 
agriculture, an increase in protectionism (including imperial products), and a substantial 
reduction of the government wage bill
45
.  
 
The government’s relative inaction towards the farming crisis led to the appearance of rifts in its 
close relationship with the Turkish-Cypriot councillors. The councillor Dr. Eyoub voted 
regularly against tax increases, arguing that the government should first check its rising 
expenditure, especially in terms of civil service salaries. As the economic situation deteriorated, 
the Turkish-Cypriot councillors were under pressure to vote for increased taxation that would 
further reduce the income of their community. The weakness of the administrations’ finances 
increased the power of the legislative council to demand its opinions to be heard, but the 
circumvention of the council altogether through Orders-in-council increased the frustration of 
political leaders who were already under pressure for the willingness to cooperate with the 
colonial authorities. The disagreement between the council and the government led to a political 
friction that could ignite to violence. 
 
By April 1931, the government was forced to pass further tax increases through “orders-in-
council”, after acrimonious debates in the legislative council ended in the bills being constantly 
defeated in the Legislative council through the combination of Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
delegates. As the drought was prolonged, Nicosia was inundated by grain farmers from the 
surrounding Mesaoria plain, who had lost their livelihood. Their presence made the political 
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deadlock potentially explosive and Cypriot councillors felt the pressure that something had to be 
done to help farmers immediately.  
 
The government’s continued use of orders-in-council led to increasing calls by the Greek-
Cypriot radicals for the Greek-Cypriot legislative councillors to resign and begin a policy of 
open resistance for union with Greece
46
. The growing pressure by the press eliminated any room 
for manoeuvre of important Greek-Cypriot leaders, such as the Metropolitan Mylonas, who were 
afraid of losing leadership of the Greek-Cypriot community. The leadership of the Greek Cypriot 
community was being challenged, threatening the role of the church as the interlocutor of the 
community’s desires. Faced with such an upheaval within their own ranks, Greek-Cypriot 
leaders, such as the previously moderate Metropolitan Mylonas, chose to declare an open call for 
civil disobedience since “As a member of the council … taken the oath of Allegiance to King 
George, but as a ecclesiastical and national leader I am now obliged to recommend to the 
Cypriots… [to] disobedience” for the goal of union with Greece47.  
 
The governor was shocked: the moderate Bishop had openly called for civil disobedience and 
questioned the legitimacy of the British rule, on the basis of it failing to deliver the promised 
economic welfare to the population. Storrs did not expect this: even at the end of his life the 
governor refused to believe that the Bishop wrote the manifesto of his resignation
48
. Yet the 
colonial administration failed to understand the pressure brought to bear by the communities who 
elected them councillors such as Nicodemos to the council. Faced with the massive reduction of 
per capita incomes and the partial failure of the agricultural crop, community leaders had to 
deliver something to their communities. The decision to ignore the councils suggestions on 
economic planning and to use orders in order to raise taxes on staple imports made the moderates 
positions untenable. The Bishop of Kition felt that unless he acted the church would lose the 
primacy as the main organ of expression of the community’s desires.  
 
The announcement of the Bishops’ registration letter led to a protest march in Nicosia that 
concluded in violence and the burning of the Governor’s house: from then on riots spread 
throughout the island, leading to several deaths
49
. We were able to account for 153 incidents of 
disturbances, and we have placed 146 on the map of Cyprus using GIS software. Figure 2 shows 
the incidents of disturbances as overlaid over the main agricultural crop of each area. Excluding 
the incidents in cities, over 62.6% of disturbances occurred in areas that were mainly growing 
wheat, which had the most significant drop in output due to the combination of the drought and 
the Great Depression.  
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Figure 2: GIS of Disturbances in October 1931 
 
 
  
The riots were widespread and significant, lasting for over a month and taking place in every 
district of the island. The riots resulted in 21 dead Cypriots (the British confirm only 17) and an 
unknown number of wounded. Military re-enforcements were rapidly flown in, leading to the 
quelling of the unrest by the end of October. Storrs reputation did not survive the riots: he was 
replaced by a military governor. The military governor decided to cover the the budget deficit of 
1931 and 1932 through a punitive tax against the Greek-Cypriot population as the instigators of 
the violence, a tax which was collected until 1936. The colonial government resinded the council 
and it remained authoritarian until independence in 1959: the main actors, including the Bishop 
of Kition was sent in exile, and over 2,679 persons were convicted in connection to the riots.   
 
The basis of the disagreement between the legislative council was effectively not so much about 
whether a deficit was in order, but about which preventative actions were needed to avoid the a 
deficit occurring in 1921. The fact is it was very clear that London was not willing to act as a 
lender of last resort and allowed the political conflict to escalate. Even a deficit of -1.4% of GDP 
in 1930 was enough to lead to extreme political confrontation and lay the foundations for 
violence.  
 
What does this case study tell us about the current situation?  
 
It is clear that Cyprus faced the most severe economic depression during the period 1929-1933, 
making its current economic malaise seem shallow in comparison. The fall of income for the 
majority farming population was very severe, making them much more resistant to the 
government efforts to decrease its disposable income through taxation increases, and more prone 
to incitements of violence.  
 
A country cannot afford a tax system that is more cyclical than income. A large part of the 
problem in colonial Cyprus was that any increases in taxation resulted to lower than expected 
increases in revenue. This was due to the fact the tax system based itself largely on two very 
cyclical elements of the economy: Trade and Agriculture. A broader tax system can be more 
stable and reduce the disproportionately large effect a global crisis can have on the government 
revenue . 
 
The size of a country’s deficit is less important that other factors such as the general situation in 
the economy and the lack of lender of last resort. The lack of a lender of last resort is a crucial 
weakness in the current Eurozone system and Cyprus in 1930 indicates that: a severe budget 
deficit crisis occurred in 1930, even thought the deficit was -1.4% of GDP and well within the 
Growth and Stability pact criteria, although failing the more recent criteria for fiscal prudency (-
0.5% of GDP).  
 
The lack of lender of last resort is the major issue affecting the debt crises, and it is more 
important that the actual size of the debt itself. A commitment by the colonial office to cover any 
shortfall would have partially absolved the need for political conflict in Cyprus. Politics would 
not become so polarised if there was the ability for Cyprus to borrow in the short term. In 
extreme economic downturns political sides can feel the pressure of the economic situation and 
believe it is time for action and not words: as a result they could act in a way that would make 
the violence likely.  
 
Likewise an understanding of a need of a lender of last resolve in the Eurozone would be much 
more effective in controlling debt crisis than the additional measures suggested by the new 
Eurozone agreements. Fiscal restriction is no alternative to the ability to borrow without question 
by a lender of last resort: debt crises can occur even if the debt is at much lower levels, and the 
fiscal policy is more restrictive. What matters is not so much the size of the problem but the 
ability of countries that are in trouble to get the sort of help they need to tie them over. Even with 
very limited government debt and a small deficit, governments that do not have independent 
monetary policy can come to situations that create economic turmoil and political deadlock.  
 
The implication of the new Eurozone rules is to follow a very restrictive government role even 
when the economy is expanding. Under a system with restrictive fiscal and monetary control 
government expenditure should not rise faster than GDP but surpluses saved for balancing 
losses. One could point out that if Cyprus saved all its surpluses from 1921 to 1929 then it would 
have easily weathered the storm inflicted on government finances in 1930/1931 without the need 
for tax increases or a lender of last resort. A strictly balanced budget rule needs exactly that: 
Cyprus despite having surpluses Cyprus in the 1920s expanded the role of government: as a 
result a 1929 of about 2% of GDP was not enough to avoid the need of a lender of last resort. 
Hence the restriction on fiscal policy is not just for countries that fail to balance budgets: 
government growth should not rise faster than GDP growth if there is no lender of last resort.  
 
Microstates such as Cyprus show that such economies are very susceptible to global downturns, 
since they treat most events as exogenous events (price fall and drought in 1930s, Greek decision 
for haircut in 2012), which means they lack the means to prevent a normal recession turning to a 
severe recession. Economic crisis in Cyprus are do not just create a government shortfall in 
revenue, but also affect the credit market with severe credit retrenchment. This is not just for 
Cyprus but more valid in small states, which are particularly vulnerable in certain situations out 
of their control. More research is needed on the way to reduce the vulnerability of credit systems 
in Micro states under monetary unions, and the common banking supervisory agreement will 
help ease the vulnerability of the credit market of microstates to the global downturn. 
 
In addition the creation of an administrative procedure between London and Cyprus or between 
Brussels and Cyprus creates delays. These delays rob the local government of the ability to react 
to events on the ground and allow time not only for political opposition to organise but also for 
the political situation to be polarised and reach extremes and violence. The resulting agreements 
can sometimes seem as lacking in popular legitimacy creating the political friction that can result 
to violence. Once violence occurs, the advantage that the outside controller (whether it is the 
colonial office London or the collective of fellow European member states) hoped to gain with 
the delay and negotiation is lost. More emphasis is needed on the need to reduce social friction in 
order not to allow violence to occur, as it is counterproductive to all aims.  
 
As a result as much care involving stakeholders should take place as reaching a mutually 
agreeable deal. Overpowering political opposition to the government plan to handle the crisis has 
some very dangerous consequences. The government, worried about the lack of funds, decided to 
overpower the political will of the Cypriots through “orders-in-council”; the Cypriot leadership, 
feeling the pressure from their communities, felt they needed to do something to show their 
displeasure at being ignored. We underestimate how a severe economic crisis brings to the 
forefront a sense of urgency that is unhelpful and polarizing in already stressed political 
environments. The urgency of “something needs to be done” led to the colonial government 
sidestepping the legislative assembly rather than undertaking negations in order for the deficit to 
be curtailed, but ensured that with any spark, violence could occur. 
 
The violence had lasting consequences. The October 1931 riots had serious long term effects and 
coloured the relations of the British and the Greek-Cypriots, eventually leading to the anti-
colonial conflict. Holland and Markides argued that “the rupture of October 1931 was to define 
the polarities of colonial Cyprus for a long time ahead” as it resulted in the final rupture of any 
sentiments of cooperation that remained in Greek-Cypriot moderates, leading to the EOKA 
conflict after the Second World War
50
. In addition the Greek-Cypriot leaders moved away from 
discussing economic considerations and towards demanding union with Greece, thus losing the 
ability to present a united front with the Turkish-Cypriots against the British, and fostering inter-
communal tensions. As the declaration of Enosis, became the singular aim of the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership, it led to direct confrontation against the British and the Turkish-Cypriot community. 
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